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The Politics of Public Budgeting in Illinois:
Second Edition
By John L. Foster and John S. Jackson
Abstract
This paper is about taxing, revenue, and public budgeting in Illinois. The concept of public
budgeting includes both the revenues raised by government and the ways in which those
revenues are spent on the functions and programs sponsored by governments. This paper
focuses especially on spending, that is, on how and where revenue is distributed in the state in
the form of public services and programs. It provides relevant data on the statewide
distribution patterns and especially the question of whether those expenditures of the taxpayers’ money disproportionately benefit one region over the other. This question has
provoked a long debate in Illinois, and it is one of the key questions influencing budgeting, and
most notably, the raising of revenue in the state. The distinctive backdrop for this analysis is the
two-year stalemate over the state’s budget from 2015-2017, which did lasting damage to the
state and the continuing questions over what Illinois should do next regarding taxes and
spending, which were crucial issues in the 2018 elections. The same issues were important
again in the 2020 elections, especially in the battle over Governor J.B. Pritzker’s graduated
income tax referendum. The defeat of the governor’s signature plan ensures that this debate
will continue well into the future in Illinois, including the possibility of a rerun of the
constitutional amendment proposal in the 2022 elections.
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Introduction to the Second Edition
This is the second edition of this paper that we have published. The first edition with the same
title was published in July of 2018 as paper number 53 of the Simon Review. The current paper
is number 59 in the series.
There are two conditions that justify a second edition of any book or paper. The first condition
is that the original publication should have attracted an audience. We are pleased to note that
this condition has been met by the fact that the original paper, which is available through the
SIU Library’s Open SIU online repository, has recorded almost twelve thousand downloads of
the paper so far. This makes the first edition the single most widely utilized paper, by this
measure, in our entire Simon Review series. It is also in the top five of the most downloaded
papers in Open SIU’s entire series of research papers.
The paper has attracted interest from a broad array of public officials, scholars, nonprofit and
good government groups, and the media. Both authors have been contacted and interviewed
multiple times by representatives of all of those sources seeking comments and additional
information. We have also been personally engaged in conversations with students, friends,
casual acquaintances, and complete strangers who were aware of the paper’s major findings
and wanted to discuss them. We are hopeful that the second edition will attract similar
attention.
The second condition warranting a new edition is that new information, new data, and new
developments in the policy-making and political worlds are available, which should keep the
subject relevant, interesting, and worthy of an updating.
The first edition of the paper was heavily dependent on invaluable basic work provided by the
Legislative Research Unit (LRU) of the Illinois General Assembly. The LRU’s Research Response
Report was titled “Taxes and Distribution by Region of the State.” It was issued in 2015,
containing a massive amount of data collected for FY 2013 documenting both state revenues
and expenditures by county and geographic areas across Illinois. The report included all of the
state general fund revenue and expenditures that could be accounted for at the county level for
that year.
The LRU report undoubtedly took an enormous amount of time and work to compile. We, and
all of the citizens of Illinois, are indebted to this organization and the Illinois General Assembly
for this invaluable research collection. The publication of their report constitutes an invaluable
contribution to governmental transparency and accountability in Illinois, and we want to
acknowledge that service.
Our second edition is based on comparable data provided by the Commission on Government
Forecasting and Accountability (CoGFA) of the Illinois General Assembly, which the LRU merged
with after they produced our earlier report. CoGFA provided comparable updated reports at
the request of Representative William Davis. We are indebted to both the staff of CoGFA and
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Representative Davis for enabling this important research enterprise to continue. The current
reports include FY 2014, FY 2015, and FY 2016 – a period of significant political transformation
and budgetary conflict, as we will see.
The new data collection, reporting requirements, and data limitations are the same as for our
first edition. They are contained in those CoGFA reports and in Appendix A of this paper. We
also include new public opinion data in this new edition. The updated public opinion data is the
product of our latest Simon Poll done in February of 2020. Deep cultural, partisan, ideological,
and geographic divisions provide the essential political context in which budget decisions, or
the “allocation of scarce resources” are made in Illinois (Easton, 1953).
The Political Context of the Budget Years Studied
It is important to provide some governmental and political context for the years covered in
these reports. The FY 2013 data in our first edition was for the last half of calendar year 2012
and the first half of calendar year 2013. At that time, Pat Quinn was governor and the
Democrats controlled both houses of the General Assembly.
As recounted in our first edition, Quinn and the Democrats increased the state income tax in
the 2010 legislative session in an attempt to balance the budget and start addressing the state’s
chronic structural deficit. This controversial decision helped increase the state’s revenue
substantially by about five billion dollars starting in FY 2011, and it was also reflected in the FY
2013 budget data covered in the first edition. However, this increase was sold as a “temporary”
increase, and it was set to expire at the end of calendar year of 2014, which it did on January 1,
2015.
In summary, the state’s FY 2014, 2015, and 2016 reports include 2014, which was a complete
year under the new and temporary rate; FY 2015 when there was a six-month period under the
temporary rate and one half year at 3.75, to which the tax rate reverted at the beginning of
2015; and a whole year, FY 2016, with the reduced tax rate and the significant reduction in
revenue that resulted from the tax increase expiring and the state returning to the former rate.
FY 2016 was also the first year of an epic fight between the majority Democrats in the General
Assembly and the Republican Governor Bruce Rauner. As a result of their failure to compromise
and pass a budget bill, there was no official state appropriated budget for two fiscal years. That
story is recounted in more detail below; however, the point here is that this was a period of
extended legislative gridlock, which was caused by a fundamental conflict over taxes and the
budget. Thus, the longitudinal data included in the new second edition documents the
significant period of budgetary and tax revenue impact resulting from the political fight
between the two parties and between the legislative and executive branches. That kind of
gridlock has become all too familiar in our modern era of deeply polarized politics.
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Perception and Reality in Public Policy Making
Our paper raises important questions related to perceptions and realities in politics and their
role in the never-ending debate over the making of public policy, and especially budgeting.
Constructing a budget and deciding each year how to spend the projected revenues are two of
the most fundamental things all governments are required to do. Budgeting shares equally with
“providing for the common defense” in the words of the U. S. Constitution – that is, ensuring
public safety at the state and local levels and for the national defense at the national level.
Those two receive top billing as the most important functions the public expects from their
government.
As anyone who is conversant with Illinois government over the past few years knows, Illinois
was not able to perform that basic function, i.e., could not adopt a full state spending plan for
over two years, a failure unprecedented in the state’s modern history. In addition, Illinois has
run a structural deficit in its budget for almost two decades since the turn of the century –
another budgeting failure. This paper explores some of the root causes for those failures and
some of the basic lessons we should learn from those experiences to guide the state’s future.
It is often asserted by those who study politics that perception is more important than reality in
the rough and tumble of the American political process. This is because public opinion,
campaigns, and elections have a major impact on the making of policy, and this is particularly
true in tax and budget issues. It is clearly the case that the public’s perception of an issue may
well not square with all of the empirical facts. People believe what they have been taught and
what they have told by trusted sources, particularly prominent public figures, sources they trust
in the media, and what they want to believe. Never mind what the factual basis for those
beliefs are and how complex the empirical realities of establishing what “the facts” are.
This makes it more difficult to make rational public policy based in the reality of what the facts
and the empirical evidence show. If the mass public does not believe in what are objectively
provable facts, this ignorance corrupts the political discourse and makes the adoption of
rational, evidence-based public policy very problematic. For instance, if a majority or large
minorities of the public do not accept that there is a virtual scientific consensus about the facts
of climate change being real and that human activity has been the most significant cause of that
change, then the potential for the adoption of realistic measures to combat it become more
problematic (Popovish and Livia Albeck-Ripka, December 14, 2017).
It is the role of a pluralistic community of scientists, engineers, researchers, scholars, and
informed experts to try to learn what the relevant facts are and to understand what we do not
know and where the boundaries of ignorance still need to be pushed back. This is the
fundamental role of research. There are well-founded rules required by the scientific method
that are the rules of the game in the establishment of empirical truth. Those rules govern the
ways in which a widely recognized body of public knowledge is created. The professional
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communities in each discipline share a respect for those rules and research requirements and
understand what is involved in expanding the scope and limits of accepted public knowledge.
Transferring that fairly “academic” and arcane scientific world to the political debate is a
challenge in modern American politics, or in the politics of any state or nation in the 21 st
century. “Experts,” scientist, engineers, medical doctors, public health care specialists, and
basic researchers are easily dismissed as “elites” who are trying to tell us what to think and
what to do in a political world that recently has been infected by a mass populist movement, in
the U. S. and in many other nations. The manifestations of this mentality are as diverse as the
“Brexit” movement in Great Britain and Europe and “Trumpism” in the United States. This
paper explores the occurrence of one major disconnect between perception and reality that
has long impacted the politics of Illinois, and has especially influenced the political discourse
and the making of public policy in the fields of taxation and budgeting in the Prairie State.
The nation’s most recent foray into the world of science versus politics and its impact on the
making of public policy came in the jarring disruption of our lives and the economy during the
COVID-19 pandemic, which started for the United States in January of 2020, and which,
unfortunately, still dominates much of life in America here at the beginning of 2021. That
conflict was on daily display in former President Donald Trump’s afternoon news updates from
the White House Press Room at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis in March of 2020. The
president initially presided personally over the event and assembled behind him a lineup of
Vice President Mike Pence and various cabinet secretaries and administration officials to
present and support Trump’s message. The administration officials discussed various policy and
executive actions that were being contemplated or explained and defended actions already
taken. Often the president’s narrative and the following question-and-answer sessions with the
reporters degenerated into contentious exchanges, with the reporters asking pointed and often
critical questions about what he had known, when he had known it, and what the
administration had done to mount a federal response to the spread of the virus. Trump also
often responded with sarcasm and hostility toward the reporters. Those exchanges, not
surprisingly, often dominated the coverage in the next news cycle.
The scientific community in the early days was led by Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Dr. Fauci was the nation’s leading expert in
this field, and he had been in his position since the Reagan Administration when he was fighting
the HIV crisis of the 1980s. Fauci was joined on stage, and in the ensuing television and media
appearances, by Dr. Deborah Birx, who was the Trump Administration’s Coronavirus Response
Coordinator. She initially was called home from overseas by Trump when the crisis began, and
she had impeccable credentials as an international specialist in the infectious disease and
epidemics field. Dr. Birx succinctly presented the basic facts and the best scientific projections
available about the spread of the virus and the potential paths for getting control of it from a
calm and dispassionate perspective. Dr. Birx also reportedly did not offend the president as
much as the more direct Dr. Fauci did, and she managed to avoid Trump’s public ire when she
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diplomatically reported that the scientific data and projections did not align with the
president’s narrative and claims. Later, Dr. Birx was relegated to a somewhat lower profile role
by the Trump Administration, while Dr. Fauci became the leading voice for the scientific and
public health communities and was widely recognized as such throughout the nation.
The two doctors tried to keep the focus on the facts, the data, and the mathematical models,
and their explanations and projections of what it all meant about the spread of the virus.
The press immediately picked up on the discrepancy between the narrative advanced by Trump
Administration officials and the scientific community. This discrepancy was also reinforced by
policy decisions being made by most of the state governors and especially those in the states
with the most virus cases at that time like New York, California, Ohio, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois. It wasn’t lost on the media that most of those big state governors
were Democrats, although a few were Republicans, and the governors in a bipartisan manner
seemed to be much more in agreement with the scientists and one another than with the
Trump White House, although the Democrats were much more vocal about it.
Some Republican governors, most notably those from Ohio, Massachusetts, and Maryland,
were also fairly vocal about their disagreements with the administration. Those from the
reddest states and the most rural states were usually very circumspect in their views of the
federal response, while at the same time taking some or most of the same steps to mitigate the
danger and destruction of the virus as their more vocal colleagues were taking in the states
with the hotspots. The governors were truly caught in the middle in this crossfire.
This drama played out in the national spotlight, which pitted the public health experts who
urged caution and stressed how long it would take to develop adequate COVID-19 testing and a
vaccine against the president and the part of his team that wanted the public health rules
reduced or eliminated and the economy reopened as soon as possible. The public drama
opened in late April when small demonstrations gathered in multiple states protesting the
mandated health restrictions and demanding the reopening of jobs and the economy
immediately. Some Republican governors, most prominently in Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma,
Missouri, and Texas, eagerly led the way in lifting some of the restrictions in the interest of
getting businesses opened, even though their states did not meet the national guidelines
promulgated by the Trump Administration. Most other governors and health care professionals
responded that the restrictions had to be given more time to do their work in reducing the
rates of infection and getting mass testing in place to track the virus and its spread. The conflict
between science and the experts and politics at this point took on life-and-death ramifications.
The polls indicated that a large majority of the mass public agreed more with the scientists and
public health experts; however, the dissenters got widespread national attention from the mass
media, and they were supported and encouraged by the Bully Pulpit in the Oval Office (Scott,
and Balz. April 21, 2020, 3).
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This debate went on through the rest of the spring and well into the summer of 2020. As some
states opened back up aggressively in April and May, the pressure grew on neighboring states,
who were taking a slower and more cautious approach to lifting the restrictions on retail
establishments, bars and restaurants, and other public gatherings. The overall national
response to the pandemic was uneven, confusing, and largely uncoordinated. By early summer,
the focus of the virus’ incidence and spread shifted from the Northeast and the West Coast to
the South and Southwest. The Sunbelt States, which had the least restrictive public health
requirements and opened their economies first, experienced accelerating rates of sickness and
death. Some of those state governors reimposed more stringent restrictions, while others were
determined to stay the course and put the economy first. This conflict and uneven response by
the various states only continued and intensified into the fall, when there was a resurgence of
cases and deaths, which public health officials had warned about consistently. That resurgence
then became a major issue in the fall election as President Trump’s and former Vice President
Joe Biden’s campaigns took diametrically opposed stances about the virus and how to combat
it.
The spread of the pandemic continued to grow, and the debate over the proper public policy
stance for the states and the federal government became an even wider partisan division.
The pandemic clearly displayed the dichotomy between the scientific community’s
commitment to the scientific method and data-driven decisions and political leaders’ penchant
for using facts to serve their own policy preferences and give the public what they think they
want. The COVID-19 disaster is just the most recent case study, although an historic and deadly
one, in the long-running struggle between rational, fact-based decision-making and the power
of myth and misinformation in the American political system and culture (Flesher and
Borenstein. April 21, 2020, 3).
We have had that same dichotomy between the hard truths of the Illinois tax system and
budget versus the tendency of some political leaders to avoid conveying unpopular truths in
evidence for much of the 21st century in Illinois, and it extends back into the last three decades
of the 20th century, if not even before.
Popular Perceptions of the Budget and Taxing in Illinois
Americans in general do not like taxes, and the people of Illinois are no exception to that
general rule (Fox, November 13, 2017, 62-67). This is perhaps a natural inheritance from our
revolutionary past, which saw a new nation born in part out of the grievances of the colonists
against the British crown, and the popular uprising of the colonists against the “Stamp Act”
taxes that helped spark the American Revolution. “No taxation without representation” was a
popular battle cry that helped propel the relatively weak and disorganized colonies to make war
on the strongest military power on earth at that time.
It is significant that an appeal to that spirit of independence and rallying against taxes imposed
by England was a part of the narrative of the modern Tea Party’s uprising against the federal
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government and the Obama Administration in 2009 and 2010. The Tea Party’s popular adoption
of the Revolutionary War’s coiled black snake on a yellow background flag with the warning
“Don’t tread on me,” was the symbolic embodiment of this revolt against the governing party in
particular and all political elites in general. That was the beginning of the populist uprising that
heavily influenced the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections, and reached its apex in the election of
Donald J. Trump in 2016. This movement still roils our politics today. It may be that the dislike
of taxes is universal; however, in the U. S. that impulse is deeply embedded in our history and
political culture, encouraged by a substantial proportion of the political leaders, and
constantly reinforced by the tenor of most of our campaigns.
No matter how much we hate taxes in general, we do like a great number of concrete public
policies and programs that are supported by that revenue. We like and depend on the functions
the taxes can buy. Symbolically, this dichotomy was represented by the Tea Party demonstrator
in 2009 holding a sign that read, “Keep your government hands off my Medicare.” Our earlier
analyses of longitudinal data covering public opinion in Illinois over time shows clearly that a
healthy majority of Illinois voters want to keep and not cut substantially all the most important
and most expensive services funded by state government (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, June
2016; Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, July 2019). Public education, public safety, public health,
parks and recreation, etc. all received high levels of support coupled with majority opposition
to budget cuts when asked where specifically the state budget should be cut to address the
state’s continuing deficit.
Polls at the national level also support the view of the American public as being schizophrenic in
our desire for both low taxes and relatively generous provisions of public goods. We are
especially solicitous of those programs that benefit us and people like us. It is only foreign aid,
welfare, and “waste and fraud” that Americans generally believe are the source of the
problems of the federal budget, and the cuts should come from what other people in other
classes or other parts of the country or state are receiving from the government if reductions
are to be made.
This schizophrenic view is a perennial feature of American public opinion that led Lloyd Free
and Hadley Cantril to label us as “ideological conservatives and operational liberals” in a classic
article published in 1967 (Free and Cantril, 1967, 206-261). That label is a cogent synoptic
description of the empirical data found in our Illinois polls over the 2008-2018 period (Jackson,
Leonard, and Deitz, 2018 and 2016; Jackson and Leonard, 2014; Jackson and Gottemoller,
2007).
Polarization
It has become commonplace in both the popular press and academic literature to observe that
the nation is deeply divided, or “polarized.” While there are nuanced differences between some
scholars about the depth and the policy impact of this polarization, most researchers conclude
that it is real at the political elite level and fairly advanced and deep at the mass voter level as
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well. Empirical studies indicate that we are deeply divided by geography, class, race, religion,
party, and ideology, and those divisions have grown much more marked over the past two to
three decades (Levendusky, 2009; Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008; Heatherington, 2001).
These divisions manifest most importantly in the way we vote individually, and in the mass
distribution of public opinion collectively. It also shows up in the way the voters react to the
personalities and issues of the day. For example, the nation’s views on what kind of job the
president is doing or where public opinion stands on proposed policies are profoundly
influenced by which party the respondent belongs to and what their ideological positions are.
Those evaluations swing wildly from time to time with a change in presidents or the party in
power in Congress.
Similarly, voting patterns and the results of elections at state, local, and national levels are
deeply influenced by where the voters live. The acceptance of the red state versus blue state
symbolism and the deep differences those symbols represent are so widespread and complete
that they have become a handy popular shorthand for summarizing the many issues and
personalities that divide the American people.
Probably the most readily recognized application of the red state versus blue state dichotomy is
in the wide acceptance of the fact that Americans are deeply divided into the predominantly
rural and the predominantly urban states (Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008). The national map of
the state winners of the presidential votes always show a deeply and predictably divided
nation, which played out again when the winner of the electoral vote prevailed over the winner
of the popular vote in the 2016 election, which in this respect was a replay of the 2000 election
results.
What is not so widely recognized is that inside the states, counties and regions are often also
easily recognizable by their long-running pattern of voting for either the Republicans or
Democrats so routinely that they provide safe seats in both the state legislatures and in
Congress for most of their legislative representatives. There are well-recognized patterns of red
rural counties and blue urban counties voting consistently for their favored party over a very
long period of time in almost all the states. This theme is widely documented and analyzed in
a variety of literature on the sources of our current polarization (Florida, 2016; Bishop, 2008;
Gelman, 2008; Levendusky, 2009).
This red county versus blue county history is especially evident in Illinois where our politics
are marked and marred by regionalism. It is so prevalent that fairly often some angry pundit or
politician will advance the perennial idea of dividing Illinois into two states, Chicago and the
downstate region, ostensibly in order to free the rural areas from the burdens of Chicago. In the
March 2018 primary, one Democrat running for governor, Robert Marshall, went a step further
and advocated the creation of three states: Chicago, the collar counties, and downstate
(Luciano, March 12, 2018). It is an idea that has been around for much of Illinois’ history, and
one that refuses to die no matter how impractical it is (McClelland, November 15, 2017). We
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will discuss the latest manifestation of this drive to divide Illinois into two states and present
new public opinion data on it in the next section of the paper.
In Illinois, the natural regional divisions are also exacerbated by the overlay of partisan divisions
that are longstanding. Several academic papers in this series have demonstrated clearly that
most of the 102 counties in Illinois have voted so routinely for either the Republican candidate
or the Democratic candidate over time that there is no problem in designating them as either
red counties or blue counties (Jackson, 2011). Most other states show a similar pattern. These
patterns are historical and hold true despite marked differences in issues and candidates across
disparate elections, for decades and even political generations. This electoral stability provides
the dependable and expected continuity in our election results.
In Illinois, however, there are still enough “swing counties,” or those where the partisan
distribution is so close, or where there are enough independents or voters who are only weakly
committed to their party that they can go either way depending on the candidates or the issues
involved with a particular race. These voters and a modicum of “crossover voters”, i.e. partisan
loyalists who temporarily deviate from their party to vote for a candidate of the other party,
can provide the change and the dynamism in the vote totals and in the ways elections are
conducted and how they turn out.
Those swing voters exist, and they are also more predominantly found in the suburban areas.
Thus, the deep divisions between the urban and the rural counties are somewhat tempered by
the independent voters and the swing voters who can provide the winning margin in a closely
divided state or county. This tends to be the major pattern in Illinois where the suburban ring of
Cook County outside the city and the five suburban counties of DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry,
and Will can – and usually do – provide the difference between victory or defeat for many
statewide candidates.
Thus, Illinois tends to be a predominately blue state because of the advantage in party
identification that the Democrats enjoy in statewide races. However, Illinois can and frequently
has elected Republicans to statewide offices depending on the personalities and resources of
the individual candidates and the driving issues of that particular campaign. Former Governor
Bruce Rauner is the most prominent example of that Republican potential, as are former
Senators Mark Kirk and Peter Fitzgerald, and a long list of recent Republican governors,
including George Ryan, Jim Edgar and Jim Thompson.
The political tactic that is exaggerated in Illinois is the fact that individual candidates can and
often do use these political and geographical divisions as a major narrative or rationale for their
campaigns. As candidates see it, they need to excite and motivate their base – that is, the loyal
party faithful – to turn out voters no matter what the current issues are. They also need to
attract some of the independents and just enough crossover voters from the other side to be
competitive or make them a winner.
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This is what happened in the 2014 governor’s race in Illinois, for example. Republican Bruce
Rauner faced Democratic incumbent Pat Quinn. Quinn had initially inherited the job from the
impeached Rod Blagojevich on January 29, 2009. He then won a new term on his own in
November of 2010 (White, 2013-14, 21). Right at the beginning of that term, Quinn led the
Illinois General Assembly in adopting an increase in the state income tax. Quinn argued that this
increase was necessary to address a long-term structural deficit that had been built into the
state’s spending habits, which consistently exceeded its revenue flow, a problem that extended
back across governors of both parties and various partisan counts in the General Assembly.
During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, Illinois was particularly hard-hit by decreases in state
revenue and increases in the need for spending on state services. This is what happens in all
recessions. There was also a unique increase in pension demands because of the “ramp” in the
state’s share of pension obligations that had been built into the pension reform plan adopted in
the mid-1990s under Governor Jim Edgar. Edgar’s plan depended on ballooning payment rates
for the state’s share of the pensions after the turn of the 21 st century. Those payments were
not made due to decisions made by governors from both parties and subsequent General
Assemblies. At the same time, services were not cut, and this is the definition of a “structural
deficit.”
Put simply, unpaid bills began to pile up and the state’s ability to pay them through the
manipulation of various accounts and one-time-only fixes had declined. So, Quinn advocated an
income tax increase and the Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate passed it in
January of 2011 without a single Republican vote in favor.
With $5 billion of new revenue from the tax increase, the state started paying its bills more
nearly on time than before and stated paying down the backlog of unpaid bills, most notably its
required annual state pension payments. The state issued two general obligation operating
bonds in order to pay for a majority of the annual pension contributions in 2010 and 2011. In
2010, they had passed a pension reform bill that created a second tier for new state hires, and
this helped reduce the estimated long-term pension obligations. These steps plus the new
revenue from the income tax increase helped to stabilize the budget for the period of 2011
through 2014. The unpaid bill backlog was reduced from $11 billion to about $6 billion by
January of 2015, when the “temporary” income tax expired.
Quinn also adopted some program expansions during his second term. Some of these later
became the basis for charges of “waste and fraud” that were leveled at him. One case involving
a community development program on the South Side of Chicago lent some credence to this
charge (Jackson, 2015).
This all set the stage for the 2014 campaign for governor and the General Assembly. Pat Quinn
attempted to explain that the new revenue was essential to providing the base of services that
the public expected and had come to rely on, as well as to continue to pay down the
accumulated debt. Businessman challenger Bruce Rauner argued that most, and perhaps all, of
the new revenue had simply been squandered on waste and fraud and unnecessary new
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programs. The other Democrats running for statewide or local office tended to stay quiet in this
argument and emphasized their own favorite local issues. Republican candidates for the
General Assembly condemned the income tax increase and promised its reduction if elected.
In 2014, Rauner was elected with 52.03% of the two-party vote compared to 47.97% for
Quinn, or by a 4.06 percentage point margin (Jackson, 2015, Appendix C). His victory was
partially a result of his antitax campaign, which was one of the major issues of his campaign,
although he also argued that Quinn was not effective in getting things done. The Democrats
maintained a nominal 71-vote supermajority in the House; however, they could not always
count on being able to muster that majority on crucial votes. On the Senate side, the party vote
was 39 seats to 20 for the Democrats with a net loss of one seat (White, 2015, 31).
In January of 2015, when the new tax rates were scheduled to drop and a positive vote was
required to continue it, there was little support among the Democrats for voting again for
extending the tax increase and unanimous opposition among the Republicans. Thus, the
temporary increase was allowed to expire on January 1, 2015 with no plan for how to replace
the revenue it generated. With that expiration, five billion dollars of revenue per year
disappeared from the coffers of Illinois government. Wrangling broke out between the
Democrats in the General Assembly and the new Republican governor and his allies in the
legislature, although they also worked together occasionally to try to manage the deficit. The
overall result was that when the Democrats sent Rauner a budget, he vetoed it and the
Democrats could not override his veto. A deep impasse developed. Money continued to be
spent, generally at the previous fiscal year level for a variety of essential services under court
order or due to the requirements of various federal grants for matching funds.
During this time the two areas most vulnerable under these impromptu rules were social
services and higher education. K-12 was taken off the table early by action agreed to by the
governor and leaders of the General Assembly from both parties since neither group wanted to
bear the onus of not funding public schools when they were scheduled to open in August 2015.
Universities and community colleges, on the other hand, had no such protection, and they
immediately began to suffer since with no budget there were no state funds forthcoming
automatically. Students and their families also suffered because the state started withholding
MAP grants, which tens of thousands of Illinois students relied on to fund their university or
college tuition. Several universities moved immediately to use local funds to temporarily pay for
the MAP grants. This loss of state funds was somewhat alleviated by two “stopgap” budget
bills, which partially funded the universities for the short term; however, when it was all over,
for two fiscal years they had received only 41.5% of what they would have received from state
subsidy under the FY 2015 base (Miller, June 4, 2018, 1). In addition, the resort to stopgap
budgets created enormous uncertainty and dislocations for the universities and community
colleges and their students, and wreaked havoc on their ability to plan.
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In early July of 2017, the Democrats muscled through the Illinois General Assembly a new
income tax bill with a handful of Republican votes. It provided for a nearly exact return to the
prior rates of 4.95% (instead of 5.0%) for the individual income tax rate and 7.0% (or 9.5% if the
Corporate Personal Property Replacement Tax is counted) for the corporate rate (Portman,
January, 2018). This increase was expected to generate nearly five billion dollars to recoup the
same amount of revenue lost when the temporary increase expired in January of 2015.
Governor Rauner, as he had promised to do, vetoed the bill. Since the Democrats had lost their
“supermajority” in the House in the 2016 election, they had to rely on a handful of Republican
crossover votes in the House and Senate to override the veto.
After a long and sometimes raucous public debate, the Democrats were able to override the
governor’s veto with the assistance of one crossover Republican vote in the Senate and ten in
the House. The new rates went into effect immediately and the state started to replenish its
coffers with an augmented revenue stream (Bosman and Davey, July 6, 2017; Hinz, July 6,
2017).
The governor and his allies launched an intensified statewide campaign to blame the
Democrats, and especially then-Illinois House Speaker Mike Madigan, for the tax increase.
Many Republican legislators joined the governor in this condemnation of the increase, which
was essentially a return to the rate Illinois taxpayers paid from January 2011 to January 2015.
The governor also took out a series of advertisements that emphasized his opposition to the
increased tax. Many observers saw this as the starting gun for the governor’s campaign for a
second term in 2018.
Rauner’s strategy was also reinforced by his subsequent opposition to and threatened veto of
an historic measure that would fundamentally rewrite the state’s formula for how state
revenue was distributed to local school districts. This had been a perennial problem in Illinois
for at least two decades. Critics of the prevailing formula pointed out that it did not
systematically help those districts with a low property tax base, and thus those districts with a
high number of needy students were not nearly equal in the amount of money they could
spend per pupil. The wealthy districts often outspent the poor districts by a factor of three or
four to one in total state plus local expenditures per pupil.
Governor Rauner charged that the new state aid formula disproportionately favored the
Chicago Public Schools system. He pointed to a long-standing block grant program that did
apparently favor Chicago to some extent because it gave them block grants for special
education and transportation based on a guaranteed rate, whereas other districts had to apply
through a more stringent categorical grant program. This gave Chicago more money for these
particular functions, although Chicago officials claimed that they received a smaller proportion
of total state aid than their share of the state’s school population would require. In addition,
the Chicago Public School system was required to pay their share of the pension obligations
(approximately $221 million annually) while those districts outside Chicago had their share of
the pension payments picked up by the state.
15

The governor and some Republican legislative leaders claimed that the block grant guarantee
was just another “giveaway” to Chicago. This new example was seen by Chicago’s critics as
reinforcing the well-developed narrative that Chicago was always favored in the scramble for
scarce state resources.
After another contentious debate, the bill was tweaked to give the private schools an additional
allocation of new money. It made available a total of $75 million for a pilot program that would
provide tax credits for individual donations to scholarships for students to attend private
schools. This was something Republican had long supported, and even the Catholic Cardinal of
Chicago climbed on board this bandwagon, thus making it easier for Democrats to support.
With this added feature to the bill it passed handily, and the governor signed it.
By the end of the fall 2017 veto session, the script for the 2018 state elections was mostly set.
Rauner would run on getting the state back on track again and making the policy changes he
sought as necessary to making Illinois more competitive with surrounding states (Leonard,
2017). For him, this would consistently entail his pointing at Speaker Madigan as the scourge of
state government and the obstacle to all reform and progress. The governor’s “Turnaround
Agenda” continued to consist of a series of proposals to curb the power of organized labor
including “Right to Work” laws at the local level, curtailing the use of union dues to pay for
lobbying, and cutting the state’s contributions to Workers’ Compensation (Ibid). Achieving this
objective demanded the curtailing of the power of Speaker Madigan and his supporters in the
General Assembly, mostly via the passage of a term limits amendment that the governor
constantly touted.
In addition, the power of local governmental bodies had to be contained via distinct limits on
the property taxes. When pressed by reporters and in some of his television ads, Rauner also
talked about “rolling back in stages” the new income tax increase. In the runup to the primaries
in 2018, the governor continued to talk generally about the need to reduce Illinois taxes and
especially targeted the increase in the income tax as well as property taxes. On February 14,
2018, the governor gave his annual budget address. In it, he proposed rolling back the state
income tax increase over a four-year period starting with a one billion-dollar reduction, which
would have been 20% of the five billion total raised by the tax increase. He then went up with a
series of television ads touting his tax decrease plan and attacking the Democrats, especially
Speaker Madigan, for the tax increase. Critics noted that his proposed budget, however, built
the entire five billion dollars from the tax increase into his base budget for FY 2019. His budget
also depended heavily on moving public employee pension payments and health insurance
costs from the state to local governments, changes unlikely to be adopted by the legislature.
This early exchange presaged the major themes for the fall campaign.
The Democrats in the March Primary, especially J.B. Pritzker, essentially ran as the “antiRauner” candidate. Pritzker emphasized that he, too, wanted economic development and more
jobs, but his diagnosis of what that would require was essentially in direct opposition to
virtually every point in Rauner’s platform. By the time the primary votes were counted, Rauner
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and Pritzker had emerged as the nominees for their parties, although Rauner had a much closer
challenge from the far right than had been expected. He beat his challenger, State
Representative Jeanne Ives, by a narrow 20,000-vote margin, while Pritzker effectively doubled
the vote for his two closest rivals, Senator Daniel Biss and Chris Kennedy. What some termed
“the battle of the Billionaires” in the general election featured two very wealthy candidates
promising to be the champion of the middle and working classes (The Economist, 2017).
After the primary, the overall outline of the general election and the major narratives were
clearly discernable. One of the fall campaign’s central features became the fight over the
budget, the deficit, tax revenues and where to find the billions of dollars of current spending
that the budget did not support.
The general election campaign was simply an extension of the narratives from the primaries.
Rauner as the incumbent was already well known and had a controversial record to defend. It
included gridlock with the legislature, two years without a state budget being adopted, and the
resulting uncertainty and damage it had produced. Questions of the state budget and the
structural deficits were the dominant issues of the campaign. Also, Rauner was a Republican in
a state where the Democrats held an advantage on party identification, although in 2014
Rauner himself had demonstrated that Republicans could win under the right circumstances
(Jackson, 2015; Jackson, Leonard & Deitz, 2016 and 2019).
Those favorable circumstances did not prevail in November of 2018. Pritzker won with an
impressive 55%-39% margin. In addition, the Democrats in the General Assembly held on to
their majorities. This victory was accomplished despite the fact that the Democrats, with help
from a small number of Republicans, had used their majority in the House and Senate to
override Rauner’s veto of the budget, which included new revenue produced by their increase
in the income tax rates that had reverted back to the earlier rate put into place by Governor Pat
Quinn and the Democrats in the General Assembly in the FY 2011 budget.
This brief detour into the state’s electoral politics is necessary to establish the political context
in which tax rates are set, budgets are adopted, and the impact they have on county and
regional revenue rates and expenditure patterns. Our data, especially the survey data, will
show that these hard accounting facts are not always fully understood by the general public
and appreciated for their complexity. In American politics, rhetoric can prevail over reality.
Public Opinion on State Polarization
As was discussed in the introduction to this paper, the Illinois political culture has long been
marked by a deep division between the major regions of the state. Chicago versus Downstate,
and Central and Southern Illinois versus Northeastern Illinois are common themes in the
political debate. This division manifests itself especially with Western Illinois, Eastern Illinois,
and Southern Illinois residents, with their representatives perennially voicing feelings of being
left out. Those regions occasionally spark loud movements to “secede” from the rest of the
state. Never mind that this feat is nearly impossible to accomplish politically and
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constitutionally. This downstate mistrust and ire are aimed at Chicago since it is by far the
largest, the most prosperous, and the most powerful part of the state.
These feelings of regional pride or regional jealously are not completely unusual. Many states
with a big city and a dominant urban area have some of the same divisions. New York City
versus “upstate” New York, southern California versus northern California, and Atlanta versus
the rest of Georgia are all recognizable memes in their state politics. What is different or at
least exaggerated in Illinois, however, is the extent to which many Illinois leaders emphasize,
exploit and exacerbate these regional differences for their own advantage. This strategy of
running against Chicago is one of the most tried and true political strategies in Illinois politics;
or alternatively, running against the major leaders of Chicago. As the original example, Mayor
Richard J. Daley and the Daley Machine in his day were always a staple for downstate
candidates to target their ire against.
More recently, the stand-in for running against Chicago is to run against former Speaker of the
House Michael J. Madigan, the longtime leader of the House Democrats and the Chair of the
Illinois State Democratic Party. Some of the most effective campaigners against Madigan, or
before him, Daley, have themselves also been from Chicago. Democratic Governor Dan Walker
from the mid-1970s and more recently former Republican Governor Bruce Rauner are the
epitome of a Chicago candidate getting elected statewide by running against the city. That
theme was very prominent in Rauner’s campaign when he was seeking re-election in 2018, as
we noted earlier.
The 2020 general election featured two high-profile campaigns that prominently featured this
strategy of running against Speaker Madigan and other prominent Chicago-based leaders. The
first of these was the campaign against the retention of Judge Thomas Kilbride as a Justice of
the Illinois Supreme Court from the Third Judicial District. Justice Kilbride failed to reach the
required 60% approval mark and was ousted from the court, which is a very unusual occurrence
in Illinois politics. The second was the referendum on amending the Illinois constitution to
replace the state’s flat rate income tax system with a progressive income tax. This was a
proposal that Governor Pritzker ran on in 2018 and supported heavily in 2020. However, it
failed by a 45%-55% margin. While it was a serious loss for the governor, the campaign against
it also included frequent appeals to the voters’ lack of trust in the “politicians in Illinois” to keep
their word about the use of the revenue, and Madigan was frequently cited in the negative
advertising. This basic strategy appears to have continued to be a highly effective one for the
opponents of Justice Kilbride and of the graduated income tax in the 2020 general election in
Illinois.
This internecine strategy is sometimes seen in other states as well. Political scientist Katherine
Cramer wrote a well-reviewed book published in 2016 documenting the rise to power of
Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin (Cramer, 2016). In it, she explored the concept of “Rural
Resentment,” which she maintained is endemic to Wisconsin politics. She noted that much of
upstate Wisconsin is like downstate Illinois – that is, upstate residents see the urban southern
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part of Wisconsin, centered in Madison and Milwaukee, as the source of most of their state’s
troubles and places to be avoided and mistrusted. Ironically, Walker used these themes very
advantageously to win his first election and to survive the recall election against him that
followed, even though when he ran for governor he was the County Executive in Milwaukee.
Cramer also documented the pervasive extent of these urban-rural divisions in the minds of the
voters as evidenced by poll data gathered by the University of Wisconsin. Her polls showed just
how regionally divided Wisconsin was in the conviction in the upstate areas that the urban
sections of the state in the south were getting more than “ their fair share” of state resources
and the feeling that the government in Madison did not represent the values and opinions of
those who lived in the more rural areas.
Cramer later noted the similarities of these divisions in the marked rural versus urban and
sectional geographic divisions that were so vivid in the national presidential election in the 2016
election. Donald Trump mined a rich vein of anti-Washington, antiestablishment, antielite, and
antiurban resentment in places like Appalachia, the Rust Belt of the Midwest, much of the
Mountain West, and the perennial resentments in much of the South, especially the rural parts
of the old Confederacy. Several studies of the 2016 election and Trump’s victory have
demonstrated the extent to which Trump was able to mine “the politics of resentment” and the
alienation and mistrust that many Americans, especially those in the more rural areas and
those places where the global economic trends have hurt rather than helped the local economy
to carry him to the White House.
We are taking a page out of the Cramer book in our use of essentially the same polling
questions to demonstrate the extent of those rural versus urban divisions in Illinois.
The 2017 Poll Data
Our survey data are taken from statewide polls of registered Illinois voters as a part of the
Simon Poll series done by the Paul Simon Institute. These polls are designed to take periodic
measures of public opinion on a variety of political, public policy, and values questions for the
entire state.
In the March of 2017 poll we included questions regarding the perception of each region
getting its “fair share” of state resources. This was a statewide poll of registered voters with a
total of 1,000 respondents and a margin of error of 3.1 percentage points.
We included these questions because of the long-standing controversy that this issue causes in
Illinois politics and its omnipresent appearance in so many political campaigns and their
commercials. These arguments were key to the budget impasse of 2015 through 2017, and a
part of the conflict over the General Assembly’s vote to override Governor Rauner’s veto of the
budget that finally passed in July of 2017. This narrative also surfaced a couple of weeks later in
the school funding formula battles between the governor and the legislature when the
governor threatened a veto of the whole package over his charge that the formula entailed a
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“bailout of the Chicago Public School system.” While he initially signaled support for the bill, he
later vetoed it over an issue of the bill’s inadvertently leaving out some 138 small and
religiously sponsored private schools that did not have official recognition from the Illinois State
Board of Education and would not benefit during the first year from the new tax credit for
private school scholarship donations. As a result, the new law was delayed until April of 2018,
deep into the planning period for FY 2019 while these differences were resolved.
This issue of regionalism also became an important part of the political debate for the general
election in the fall of 2018. As covered above, the campaign ads during the primary season
were filled with charges that one candidate or another was “sold out” to Chicago or to Speaker
Madigan.
These regionalism issues are so pervasive in Illinois we included items specifically designed to
measure their contours in our statewide polls of 1,000 registered voters conducted in the fall of
2017. The questions were based on Cramer’s Wisconsin polls (Cramer, 2016). The first question
asked:

Table 1
“How much attention do you feel the state government pays to what the people in your
community think when it decides what to do?”
Statewide

Chicago

Suburbs

Downstate

5%

7%

6%

3%

Some

19%

16%

22%

18%

Not Much

70%

72%

67%

73%

5%

6%

5%

6%

A Good Deal

Don’t Know
Source: The Simon Poll, March 4-11, 2017

Obviously, the statewide results show that very few Illinois voters are impressed with the
extent to which their elected representatives pay attention to them or the people in their
community in making decisions. The modal category is “Not Much,” which attracted 70% of the
respondents. The results by region reinforce this image of widespread disenchantment. Broken
down by region, the similarities are striking and the differences are narrow. The downstate
residents by a small margin are the most alienated. The suburbs are the least alienated and the
most generous in their assessment of how much their legislators share their values, but the
margin of difference is not great. Confidence in the link between the governors and the
governed is one of the essential elements of representative government, and on this measure
Illinois state government elicited little confidence from the voters.
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Table 2 examines the question of how much the state government represents your
community’s values. This question also captures a fundamental tenant of mass democracy in
that the voters need confidence that their political leaders share some level of the same basic
values that they hold to. Obviously, the “Not Much or “Only a Little” categories attracted over a
majority (53%) of the statewide responses. It was also the most popular response in each of the
three geographical regions. This time the respondents from the central city of Chicago
outstripped even downstate voters in their level of alienation, although the difference is only
three percentage points. Once again, the suburban voters were the least alienated, with just
over a bare majority choosing this response. The rest of the respondents were in the
“Somewhat or Very Well” categories with 41% statewide giving the more positive responses.
Each of the three regions of Illinois hovered just at the 40% positive marker.

Table 2
“How much does the state government represent your community’s values?”

Statewide

Chicago

Suburbs

Downstate

Not Much or Only a Little

53%

57%

51%

54%

Somewhat or Very Well

41%

38%

42%

40%

Extremely Well

1%

2%

1%

0%

Don’t Know

5%

4%

5%

6%

This widespread lack of faith in state government is a problem for representative democracy. As
Hannah Pitkin has documented in detail, one of the fundamental premises of mass democracy
is that the elected representatives in government must share some of the important personal
characteristics and the basic values of those they purport to represent (Pitkin, 1987).
In addition to sharing their basic values, it is also advantageous for the governors to reflect
some of the most important socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the governed.
As Pitkin explains it, if the political leaders “look like” the governed in terms of race, gender,
and ethnic background it helps to inspire voters’ trust that the representatives also share their
values and life experiences. The drive to have more women, more African-Americans, more
Hispanics, etc. in government reflects this faith in what Pitkin calls “symbolic representation” or
descriptive representation, and it helps to create a working consensus and sense of trust
between leaders and followers that allows leaders to make hard decisions and for mass
democracy to function. Recent elections featuring what are called “populist uprisings” of “the
people” against “the elites,” both in the United States and abroad, call into question some of
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these fundamental assumptions about how well our form of representative democracy is
working to fulfill these expectations.
The most important of all the elements of representative democracy is the requirement that
the governors “act for” those they govern, to adopt Pitkin’s terminology (Pitkin, 1987). Perhaps
in the absence of a high level of faith that the decision-makers actually share the values of the
people they represent, it is even more important that there be some working level of trust that
the political elites will act faithfully for those they represent. Put simply, if they vote as I would
vote on policy issues at an acceptable level, their underlying personal values may not be as
important as the votes they cast. Perhaps this helps explain the often-discussed anomaly that in
the 2016 presidential election approximately 83% of evangelical Christians voted for Donald
Trump. None of Trump’s lifestyle choices, personal language, or church attendance record
would reflect the basic traditional value commitments of evangelical Christians. So how could
they possibly vote for him?
Some of the evangelical leaders, when confronted with this apparent contradiction, admitted
freely that they wanted Trump’s support for antiabortion bills, his opposition to same-sex
marriages, his promise to allow churches and pastors to participate openly in politics, even
from the pulpit, without losing their tax-exempt status, and his pledge to appoint conservative
Justices to the U. S. Supreme Court more than they wanted evidence that he shared their basic
values or had ever practiced anything resembling their form of traditional Christianity. When
faced with this dilemma, the church people unhesitatingly chose the “acting for” dimension of
representation over any other dimensions of representation, although they would not have
used these terms. Pitkin’s untangling of these different layers of the concept helps us to
understand how this may not have been a hard choice for those dedicated to their policy goals
first and foremost above the other dimensions of representation.
Table 3 turns to the more pragmatic questions of who gets what in the allocation of scarce
resources that state government inevitably must do as one of its most crucial functions. This is
the essence of the budgetary process at any level of government. The fact that the resources
are always scarce is what makes governing in general and budgeting in particular so important
and so conflict-ridden. It shows why you can never take “politics” out of the business of
governing. The 2015-2017 stalemate in the budgetary process in Illinois and the brief shutting
down of the federal government in the fall of 2017 and January of 2018 illustrate just how
fundamental the budgetary process is to the government’s operation. When that function fails,
government basically fails at its most fundamental level, and many ordinary people are hurt.
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Table 3
“How well does the state of Illinois do in distributing government resources equally across
rural, urban and suburban areas of the state?”

Statewide

Chicago

Suburbs

Downstate

Not at All or Only a Little

62%

60%

61%

66%

Somewhat or Very Well

24%

22%

24%

24%

1%

2%

1%

0%

14%

17%

14%

10%

Extremely Well
Don’t Know

This table explores the question of whether the state is distributing governmental resources in
an equitable manner. It is easy to see that this question also taps into the possibility for deep
wells of resentment to exist in the different areas of the state with respect to whether their
areas are receiving their “fair share” of the governmental pie. In fact, regionalism and regional
conflicts are among the most enduring themes in the political culture of Illinois. Almost any
campaign for state representative, state senate, or governor in Illinois will include a heavy dose
of one candidate accusing his or her opponent of having “sold out” to another region of the
state.
The results are not encouraging for state government, as 60% or more statewide and in all
three regions give their political leaders bad marks on this report card. Downstate is still the
most alienated toward their state government, with Chicago and the suburbs essentially the
same on the “Not at All Well” or “Only a Little” categories. Just under one-quarter of the
respondents statewide and almost the same levels in each of the regions gave the state the
“Somewhat Well” or “Very Well” marks, and only 1%-2% in all categories gave the most positive
“Extremely Well” response.
In the questions reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6 we break out these responses by the three most
widely recognized geographic regions of Illinois. This helps us see how the voters in each of the
regions evaluate the treatment they are receiving from the state as compared to their
counterparts elsewhere in the state. This is an attempt to delve a bit deeper into these regional
perceptions of who is getting their fair share.
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Table 4
“Are rural areas of Illinois given much more than their fair share, somewhat more, somewhat
less, much less or about their fair share of government resources?”

Statewide

Chicago

Suburbs

Downstate

Much More or Somewhat More

13%

24%

12%

7%

Somewhat or Much Less

48%

35%

42%

66%

About Fair Share

18%

13%

22%

14%

Don’t Know

22%

29%

24%

13%

Table 5
“What about suburban areas? Are suburban areas of Illinois given much more than their fair
share, somewhat more, somewhat less, much less, or about their fair share of government
resources?”
Statewide

Chicago

Suburbs

Downstate

Much More or Somewhat More

42%

53%

33%

47%

Somewhat or Much Less

16%

10%

19%

15%

About Fair Share

28%

18%

34%

24%

Don’t Know

15%

21%

14%

14%
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Table 6
“Lastly, what about urban areas? Are urban areas of Illinois given much more than their fair
share, somewhat more, somewhat less, much less, or about their fair share of government
resources?”
Statewide

Chicago

Suburbs

Downstate

Much More or Somewhat More

30%

14%

31%

40%

Somewhat or Much Less

37%

55%

38%

25%

About Fair Share

19%

16%

18%

23%

Don’t Know

13%

17%

12%

13%

As we anticipated, the downstate voters are the most alienated or disenchanted with their lot
from state government as compared to their peers in the other two regions of the state. They
are the group most convinced (66%) that they are not receiving their fair share, and indeed are
receiving somewhat less or much less than their fair share, as is evident in Table 4. This theme
of what Cramer calls “rural resentment” is now recognized as one of the driving forces today in
American politics (Cramer, 2016). It is one of the key components in explaining Scott Walker’s
takeover of state government in Wisconsin, and explaining how he survived the recall vote
subsequently mounted against him by a national coalition of Democrats and Progressives,
which is the story Cramer told in her book. She and many others following her lead then went
on to extrapolate the dynamics of rural resentment as one of the most important factors in the
deep rural-versus-urban distribution of the presidential vote for Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton nationwide in 2016.
What we did not entirely anticipate was the extent to which Chicago voters shared this
disenchantment with respect to whether urban voters receive their fair share. As Table 6
shows, well over a majority (55%) of Chicago voters say that the urban areas are receiving
somewhat less or much less than their fair share. This level of what we would term “urban
resentment” is exceeded only by the 66% level of resentment exhibited by Downstate rural
voters in Table 4 with respect to the rural areas’ slice of the budgetary pie (Badger, 2018, 23).
So, the politics of resentment has traction among urban voters in Chicago, just as it does among
rural voters downstate. Those political leaders who divide Illinois into regions and appeal to
regional identity and stir the sense of resentment against other regions have done their work
effectively. Tens of millions of dollars spent in uncounted numbers of political ad campaigns
over the years have appealed to and reinforced this divisive narrative in Illinois. The counter
argument of “we are all in this together,” and “what helps Illinois as a whole helps all of us,”
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and “politics does not have to be a zero-sum game,” is not getting much traction in Illinois
judging by our poll results. The leaders of most other states celebrate their state’s history,
culture, and accomplishments and promote state pride. They have at least one major state
university athletic team or a professional sports franchise that is the pride of most fans
statewide no matter what their regional allegiances are. That is not the tradition in Illinois.
Voters in the suburbs are somewhat the exception to this pervasive dissatisfaction and
resentment rule. They are about equally divided in their assessment of how well the suburbs
do in the constant battle for scarce resources. As is evident from Table 5, fully one-third (33%)
of suburban voters believe that they receive much more or somewhat more and an almost
identical 34% say that they receive about their fair share. This leaves only 19% who say that
suburban voters receive somewhat less or much less than their fair share. Trying to mine the
wellsprings of some sort of “suburban resentment” does not appear to be a particularly
promising strategy for candidates in those areas of Northeast Illinois.
All of the discussion in the first section of the paper above proceeded in a vacuum based on the
political perceptions of the people. What is usually absent from such discussions is empirical
data showing the realities of where the money is spent by the state compared to where it is
raised in the form of state revenues. That is a very different story, as we will see in the next
section of the paper. The deeply embedded strain of rural resentment reflected in our polls is
not necessarily well-founded on demonstrable facts, as we will see. But, we started this section
with the assertion that most of the time, perception is important – even crucial – in politics.
When perception does not match the facts, it is very often the perceptions the belief systems of
the people that count the most.
The 2020 Poll Data
In the 2020 Simon Poll, we continued this line of research. As discussed previously, the divisions
between downstate and Chicago are so sharp that some state and local leaders have gone so
far as to advocate for the actual division of Illinois into two states. In the March 2020 Illinois
primary election or the November general election, a total of 23 county boards in mostly
central and southeastern Illinois counties placed a referendum item on the ballot asking if the
state should be divided into two states, Chicago and all the rest. In all of these cases these
proposals were supported by more than a majority, frequently ranging from 62%-80% (Weber,
May 21, 2019; Dampier, August 1, 2019; Meadows, December 4, 2020). This proposal is
certainly not practical or politically feasible since it would require approval by both the Illinois
General Assembly and the U. S. Congress, and neither is at all likely.
This is largely a symbolic protest movement; however, it is a prominent indicator of just how far
some Illinois leaders are willing to go to express their lack of regard for the concept that all
parts of the state share more interests that unite us rather than focusing on that which
inevitably divide a state as large and diverse as Illinois. The statewide Simon Poll was an
attempt to measure just how widely this feeling is shared by the voters. The question read: “A
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group of legislators from Central Illinois has introduced a bill which would separate Illinois into
two different states, one composed of Chicago and the rest composed of downstate. Would
you favor or oppose this proposal?” Tables 7, 8, and 9 provide the results.

Table 7
Divide Illinois?
Strongly Favor

19%

Somewhat Favor

9%

Somewhat Oppose

12%

Strongly Oppose

54%

Other/Don’t Know

6%

Source: The Simon Poll, February 11-17, 2020

Almost one in five (19%) of Illinois voters were strongly in favor and another 9% were
somewhat in favor of creating two separate states out of Chicago and the rest of the state. A
total of two-thirds (66%) were strongly or somewhat opposed to the idea.

Table 8
Divide Illinois by Region
City

Suburbs

Downstate

Favor

19%

23%

43%

Oppose

74%

71%

51%

7%

6%

6%

Other/Don’t Know

The two-state proposal was widely opposed in Chicago (74%) and the suburbs (71%). Even
among Downstate respondents, a smaller majority (51%) opposed the idea, although 43% were
in favor there.
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Table 9
Divide Illinois by Political Party
Democrats

Independents

Republicans

Favor

15%

27%

48%

Oppose

80%

67%

46%

5%

6%

6%

Other/Don’t Know

The proposal was roundly opposed by Democrats (80%) and independents (67%). It was
essentially tied among Republican identifiers (48% in favor, 46% opposed). It is interesting and
disconcerting to note that just over a quarter of the sample say that that they are willing to
entertain the idea of separating the economic engine of Illinois from the rest of the state. This
proposal is probably more about cultural or political signaling, and is emblematic of the deep
polarization we see around the rest of the country. (Note: Much of the preceding discussion
originally appeared in Jackson, et al. December, 2020.)
We turn next to an analysis of the relevant economic data in general and the revenue and
expenditures data in particular to examine the possible sources of the movement for the
separation of Illinois into two states and what the potential impact might be from the deeply
embedded cultural norms that divide the state.
Economic Data
In one sense, ordinary voters – and even officials closely involved with government – should not
be faulted for not having a precise idea of which regions state revenues come from and where
they are disbursed. The state’s records do not make it particularly easy to track. In brief, there
is no single source of state revenue and disbursement data broken down either by county or by
region.
The Illinois Department of Revenue does publish income tax data on its website by county
through 2017. Sales tax revenues can be traced through the return of the local portion to
counties and municipalities. But this is a significant data management task given that the state
has 1,298 municipalities receiving funds spread across 102 counties. Lottery sales are recorded
by ZIP code. Federal Medicaid reimbursement, which accounts for over 10% of state revenue,
must be traced by the home county of recipients.
On the disbursement side, records are kept by different agencies using their organizational
units. For example, general formula and mandated categorical aid to K-12 education is recorded
by the 921 districts or separate units across the state rather than by the 102 counties. Similarly,
the state aid to community colleges data available on the Illinois Community College Board
website is categorized by 39 separate districts. State higher education aid expenditures are
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available in the Illinois Board of Higher Education records and distributed to the 12 universities.
This is attributed to the counties in which they are located, although their effects obviously spill
over county lines.
By far the most significant recent efforts to sort out state revenues and disbursements by
county are a series of reports by the Illinois Commission on Governmental Forecasting and
Accountability (CoGFA). Our first paper was based on 2013 data released in October 2015
(Legislative Research Unit, 2017; See also Legislative Research Unit, 1989). Updates for FY 2014,
2015 and 2016 were released February 2020. Using 2013-2016 tax and budget records, CoGFA
undertook a massive data management task and was able to trace from 69%-81% of the tax
revenue and from 65%-76% of expenditures from the General Funds to all 102 Illinois counties.
The largest untraced item on the revenue side was the corporate income tax. The CoGFA staff
noted that these taxes are filed in the home county of the corporation while business can be
done across a number of counties, in other states, or in other countries. Multistate
corporations are taxed on sales in Illinois without a record of county.
On the disbursement side, the largest items not traced were contributions to the various public
pension systems, which have grown to over 20% of the General Funds. Pension contributions
from the state are recorded in the counties housing the system headquarters. Later, these
funds plus employee contributions and investment returns are disbursed as payments to
pension recipients across the state, nation, and even other countries.
The major portion of the traceable tax revenues to the general fund consisted of the individual
income tax, the state share of sales tax, and the federal match for Medicaid. Much smaller
revenue sources included lottery profits, insurance taxes, and the estate tax. The traceable
disbursements in order of size included Medicaid, K-12 education aid including the mandated
categorical programs, state operations, state payroll, Local Government Distributive Fund
(LGDF), and state aid to public universities and community colleges.
The CoGFA report included several additional cautions in using this data (see Appendix A). First,
even four years of data, which we present in this edition, is obviously a snapshot in time, and
conditions do change with budget cycles. Second, economic benefits clearly spill across county
lines. And third, only the general funds data was included. Revenue sources such as the motor
fuel tax, vehicle license fees, tollway fees and expenditures such as capital projects and the
transportation category were excluded.
These are all reasonable cautions. We will focus on regions rather than counties, which will
reduce but not totally eliminate the spillover problem. That is what the CoGFA reports
suggested as well (see Appendix B). While it is true that the FY 2013-2016 data is a snapshot, it
is still useful for looking at taxing and funding for 2021 and beyond. Budgeting tends to be
incremental and the major contours of the 2021 budget are not dramatically different from the
2013 and 2014 budgets, which were before the 30-month budget standoff. The state income
tax was 5% in 2013. As noted above, it has since returned to 4.95% after a sharp reduction
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during the budget stalemate. The sales tax remained the same. Illinois fully participated in the
Federal Medicaid expansion by 2013, which remains in effect. Higher education and community
college state funding was dramatically reduced during the budget stalemate years but returned
to 90% of FY 2014 levels for FY 2018. A new K-12 school aid formula, which increases state
funding to the poorest property wealth districts, passed in 2017 and is in effect at the time of
this writing.
Looking at the contrast between the 2013-2014 base years, the 2015 half stalemate year, and
the full 2016 stalemate also creates a form of natural experiment of the effects of an
unanticipated sharp reduction in tax rates, which is inevitably followed by a breakdown in the
normal budget processes and attempts to get by as described above on pages 13-15.
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Table 10
General Funds Revenue and Expenditure, FY 2013-2016
FY 2013

FY 2014

FY 2015

FY 2016

% Change
2014-2016

$16,539
$7,319
$3,999

$16,642
$7,638
$3,761

$15,433
$7,991
$3,180

$12,891
$8,022
$2,512

-22.5%
5.0%
-33.2%

$656
$333
$293

$668
$332
$276

$679
$353
$333

$677
$397
$306

1.3%
19.6%
10.9%

$7,464

$7,726

$8,648

$5,693

-26.7%

$36,603

$37,043

$36,617

$30,498

-17.7%

$4,287
$1,728
$7,942
$5,466

$4,442
$1,728
$8,163
$7,597

$4,404
$1,998
$8,951
$5,650

$4,632
$1,691
$8,742
$3,257

4.3%
-2.1%
7.1%
-57.1%

$3,130
$1,486
$1,230
$320

$3,333
$1,031
$1,232
$321

$3,331
$1,257
$1,202
$315

$3,293
$1,543
$350
$109

-1.2%
49.7%
-71.6%
-66.0%

Disbursements Not Traceable to Counties

$10,054

$9,129

$8,513

$7,709

-15.6%

Total Disbursements

$35,643

$36,976

$35,621

$31,326

-15.3%

Revenue Traceable to Counties
Individual Income Tax
Sales Tax
Medicaid Match from Feds
Lottery
Insurance Tax
Estate Tax
Revenue Not Traceable to Counties
Total Revenue

Disbursements Traceable to Counties
K-12 Education
Education Categorical
Medicaid
State Operations
State Payroll
LGDF Distributions
Public Universities
Community Colleges

All figures in millions (i.e. x 000,000). Sources: Original revenue and disbursement data by category: CoGFA 20132016; totals: Illinois Comptroller’s Office.

Table 10 shows the short-term effects of the tax cut natural experiment, which allows a partial
test of the long-standing debate over static and dynamic models of taxation. Static models
assume that tax rates have little or no effect on the behavior being taxed. Hence, lower rates
lead to less revenue and higher rates to increased revenue. Dynamic models, in contrast, argue
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there is a significant relationship between taxation and underlying economic behavior. Many
American political conservatives in fact have long argued that tax cuts can more than pay for
themselves by increasing economic growth to the point that it will lead to greater tax revenues
even with lower rates.
We do not have data to examine the long-term effects of a state income tax cut, as the Illinois
experiment ended after two and one half years when a coalition of Democrats and Republicans
(mostly representing university districts) voted to override the governor’s veto and return to a
4.95% personal income tax rate, as noted above. But the short-term effects in Illinois are very
close to the static model. The 25% state income tax cut (5%-3.75%) that went into effect
midway through FY 2015 reduced 2015 revenue by $1.2 billion, or 7%, from FY 2014. FY 2016
income tax revenue, when the lower rates were in effect for the entire year, was reduced by
$3.7 billion, or 22.5%, from FY 2014. The corresponding reduced rates of the corporate income
tax account for most of the 26% ($2 billion) drop in the “revenue not traceable to counties”
line. Furthermore, sales tax revenue (where rates did not change) increased a very modest 5%
over this period, suggesting there was no significant increase in consumer activity, or at least
the portion of it subject to sales tax.
In addition, Federal Medicaid reimbursements were reduced by $1.2 billion, or a third, over the
same two-year period as the state slowed payments to providers in response to reduced
revenue. The half-year revenue losses for FY 2015 were cushioned by $1.738 billion in fund
sweeps and interfund borrowing, which are included in the increased “not traceable to
counties” line for that year. But that money was gone in FY 2016, creating about a $6.5 billion
(17.7%) total revenue loss in two years.
While a 25% tax rate cut leading to an immediate 22.5% tax revenue drop is what a static model
would predict, we cannot say whether this would hold longer term. Perhaps economic growth
would have climbed sharply in a few years if the lower income tax rate had been maintained?
On the other hand, it is also quite possible that changes in state income taxes are small enough
that they do not have much effect on either consumer or corporate real-world decisions. If so,
the static model may be more accurate in the world of state taxation.
The Illinois experiment also lets us look at real-world budgetary behavior when faced with a
significant revenue drop. Political science literature has long focused on the incremental model
of budgeting as the most accurate description of the normal process. Under this model, last
year’s expenditures are treated as the base and seldom questioned. Analysis and debate are
then focused on the size of the additional increment or reduction. Shares of the total pie given
to different activities change only slightly from year to year.
Table 10 above presents a vastly different picture. When revenues dropped by almost 20% in
two years, the effects varied dramatically by category. The legislature passed and the governor
signed an appropriation bill for K-12 education, which actually led to a slight increase in that
expenditure and protected it from future reductions. Continuing appropriations legislation kept
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contributions flowing to the state retirement programs, removing an option the state had relied
upon many times in previous decades during bad budget years. Most Medicaid, the LGDF and
state employees’ salaries were protected either by court order or automatic statutory transfers
that occur even without an official budget. This forced what might be called “targets of
opportunity” budgeting for what was left. The state university and community college systems
absorbed massive (71.6% and 66%) reductions in state funding, which saved a little more than
$1 billion from FY 2014 to FY 2016. The remaining cuts of about $2.4 billion in Table 10 came in
the category of state operations. In brief, the state, by never passing a formal budget, delayed
paying its bills for a significant time. And the accounts payable by the Comptroller’s Office rose
from $5.1 billion on June 30, 2015 to $7 billion on June 30, 2016. Much of this was owed to
health care providers for state employees. Other state operations included social service
agencies with state contracts, local governments that provided water and sewer for state
facilities, and private suppliers of goods and services consumed by state agencies1.
We will now turn to the regional effects of this budget experiment. The data in Table 11 from
the 2010 U.S. census provides background for the analysis to come. We first divided the state
into three regions to match the groupings used in the earlier poll data discussed in this paper.
Cook includes the City of Chicago and its inner ring of suburbs. The five suburban counties are
DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will. The other 96 counties are lumped in “downstate.”
There are, however, significant variations across these 96 counties that stretch across 400 miles
from the Wisconsin border to the Ohio River. Hence, we divided the 96 into four major
subregions, which, with some collapsing, follow the 10 economic development regions defined
by the Illinois Department of Employment Services (see Appendix C). The 18 north counties run
from the Wisconsin border as far south as Kankakee, excluding Cook and the five suburban
counties. The nine southwest counties essentially are the Illinois portion of the St. Louis
metropolitan area. The 19 southern counties are along the Interstate 64 corridor and south to
the Ohio River, except for the St. Louis metro area. We lumped the remaining 50 counties,
which make up five IDES regions, into one large central region.
Table 11 provides a quick look at the economic variation across the state. The five suburban
counties are by far the wealthiest on median household and median family income. The Cook
County region is slightly higher than the 96-county downstate region on these measures.
However, there is significant variation across the downstate counties. The 18 north counties as
a group are virtually the same as Cook County on the income measures, while the 19 southern
counties fall some distance behind.

1

It is important to note that the state continued to incur most of these services despite the unpaid bills that piled
up. State law requires an interest penalty of either 9% or 12% on state bills that are unpaid for more than 60 days.
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Table 11
County Household and Family Income by Region
Region

# of Counties
in Region

Median
Household
Income*

Median
Family
Income**

Average
County
Population

Average
County
Number of
Households

Cook

1

$53,942

$65,039

5,194,675

1,966,356

Suburban

5

$75,137

$86,860

624,395

216,756

Downstate

96

$45,752

$57,204

47,233

18,695

North

18

$53,698

$64,618

103,179

38,549

Central

50

$45,091

$56,976

67,103

27,375

9

$47,193

$58,978

48,558

19,325

19

$37,514

$48,316

20,283

8,350

Southwest
South

*Average median household income for counties in that region.
** Average median family income for counties in that region.
Source: 2010 United States Census reported in wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Illinois_locations_by_per_capita_income

At this point, it is important to note that the rural, and to a lesser degree urban, resentment
outlined in Tables 1-6 is inversely related to the regions’ broad economic conditions. The
highest levels of resentment of state taxing and spending policies occur in the downstate
counties that lag Cook County by a little and lag the five suburban counties by a lot on the
economic measures. The lowest levels of resentment of state policies are in the suburban
counties that clearly are doing the best. Urban Cook County is in the middle.
We do not have income data for the specific respondents to the survey. Hence, we cannot
conclude that low economic well-being is directly related to the level of resentment of state
policies among individuals. And we cannot break out the downstate survey data across the four
downstate subregions. If we could, we would speculate that the highest levels of rural
resentment occur in the 19 most southern counties. This speculation is partially based on the
fact that both authors have lived in southern Illinois for over 40 years each.
As noted above, downstate residents are also most in favor of dividing Illinois into new states in
some fashion. While this is almost certainly a fantasy given the political issues and
requirements in the U.S. Constitution, it is interesting to speculate at this point on the
economic consequences of a division. First, Illinois is a wealthy state. Its 2019 gross state
product was $897.12 billion ranking it fifth in the nation. Interestingly, in addition to four U.S.
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states, only 17 countries in the world have larger GDPs. On the median household and family
income numbers above, Illinois ranks 16th and 14th of the U.S. states respectively.
But as Tables 11 and 14 show, this wealth is not distributed evenly across the state and would
create sharp distinctions if the state were divided. A new state of “Northeast Illinois” consisting
of Cook and the five suburban counties would start with 73% of total state GDP and a median
household income of about $61,000 per year, which would rank about sixth in the nation. In
contrast, a new “Downstate Illinois” made up of the remaining 96 counties would account for
just 27% of present GDP and have a median household income of $45,752, which would rank
41st, just ahead of Louisiana and South Carolina. Dividing further, a new state of “South Illinois”
consisting of the 19 southernmost counties would be the poorest in the nation, ranking only
ahead of territories such as Samoa and Puerto Rico.
And these divisions likely would become worse over time. As will be shown, present state
taxing and spending policies transfer some wealth from the suburban counties to downstate
Illinois. Presumably, this would end quickly should the state division fantasy become reality.
Table 12 presents the best data available on how state taxing and spending affect the various
regions of Illinois. For this table, we took the 2013-2016 state general funds data collected by
the CoGFA for each county and aggregated it to the six regions. As noted above, the revenue
data traceable to counties and regions ranged from 69.0%-80.0% of the total over this period.
Traceable disbursement data equaled from 65.0%-75.8% of the total general funds. To make
these figures comparable over the four years, we divided each region’s total revenue and
disbursement figure by the appropriate traceable percentage for each year. This assumes that
the nontraceable general fund data (mostly corporate income tax and fund sweeps in 2015 on
the revenue side and pension payments on disbursements) is divided across the regions in the
same proportions as the known data.
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Table 12
Adjusted State Revenue and Disbursement by Region, 2013-2016

2013

2014

2015

2016

2014-2016
Change

Cook

$14,963

$15,178

$14,954

$12,433

-18.1%

Suburban

$10,068

$10,193

$10,192

$8,527

-16.3%

Downstate

$10,368

$10,098

$9,861

$8,238

-18.4%

$3,230

$3,121

$3,003

$2,505

-19.7%

Central

$4,804

$4,692

$4,598

$3,849

-18.0%

Southwest

$1,553

$1,523

$1,521

$1,278

-16.1%

$781

$762

$739

$606

-20.5%

Revenue

North

South

2013

2014

2015

2016

2014-2016
Change

$13,253

$13,397

$13,661

$12,182

-9.1%

Suburban

$5,207

$5,479

$5,434

$5,109

-6.7%

Downstate

$17,134

$18,057

$16,418

$13,971

-22.6%

$3,938

$4,060

$3,823

$3,465

-14.6%

Central

$8,860

$9,483

$8,470

$6,938

-26.8%

Southwest

$2,171

$2,215

$2,107

$1,821

-17.8%

South

$2,164

$2,299

$2,018

$1,746

-24.0%

Disbursement
Cook

North

All figures in millions (i.e., x 000,000). Source: Original county revenue and disbursement data, CoGFA 2013-16.
Regions and percent change by authors.

The effects of the budget stalemate on revenue at the regional level are probably as expected.
The relative differences in revenue raised vary by only a few percentage points across the
regions. The wealthiest region in the state (suburban) had a 16.3% tax reduction from the last
regular budget year of 2014 to the full stalemate year of 2016. Over the same period,
downstate Illinois saw an 18.4% reduction with Cook County in the middle. Breaking downstate
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into four regions shows a similar pattern. The poorest part of the state (south) had a slightly
larger 20.5% tax reduction.
On the other hand, the differences in expenditures between regions are much more striking.
The suburban region with relatively few state facilities and a smaller Medicaid population saw a
drop in state expenditures of only 6.7% between 2014 and 2016. In contrast, downstate Illinois,
which contains a disproportionate share of state facilities and Medicaid recipients, saw a 22.6%
drop in state expenditures over the same period. This reduction was particularly sharp in the
central region. This subregion – with a large number of state offices, employees, medical
providers, and suppliers in Sangamon County, along with four state universities including the
state’s largest university in Champaign County – saw a very significant 26.8% drop in state
expenditures. The 19-county southern region with one large state university as its largest
employer, along with a number of prisons and other state facilities, experienced a similar 24%
drop.
Table 13 below further examines the relationship between taxing and spending in Illinois. In this
table we divide the adjusted disbursement figure of Table 12 by the revenue figure for the fouryear period. Since both figures were adjusted under the assumption that the nontraceable
general fund dollars (again, mostly corporate income tax on the revenue side and pension
payments on the disbursement side) are divided across the regions in the same proportions as
the known data, a ratio of 1.0 indicates equivalent tax revenue going to the state as the level
of state expenditures in the region. Values above 1.0 thus indicate more state spending than
taxing in the region.

Table 13
Adjusted State Disbursement-Revenue Ratios by Region, 2013-2016
2013

2014

2015

2016

Cook

0.89

0.88

0.93

0.98

Suburban

0.52

0.54

0.53

0.60

Downstate

1.65

1.79

1.66

1.70

North
Central

1.22
1.84

1.30
2.02

1.27
1.84

1.38
1.80

Southwest

1.40

1.45

1.39

1.42

South

2.77

3.02

2.73

2.88

Source: Original county revenue and disbursement data, CoGFA 2013-2016; regions and ratios by authors.
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Tables 12 and 13 clearly show that taxes and spending are not equally distributed across the
state. Hence, the effects of the budget stalemate of 2015-2017 were not equivalent. The
suburban counties generate about twice as much in taxes as they receive in direct state
spending, and this ratio changed only modestly from 2015 to 2016. Cook County came very
close to breaking even, as it did not lose nearly as much in state spending relative to its revenue
contributions as other regions. In 2016 it provided almost exactly the same tax revenue as it
received in state spending (see Appendix C).
Downstate Illinois, on the other hand, which has historically benefited from the state tax-andspend mix, was hurt more by the budget stalemate in places. Breaking the 96 downstate
counties into four regions shows a more pronounced pattern. The 18 north counties actually
gained some in their tax/spend ratios, as their tax reductions exceeded their expenditure
losses, increasing their ratio from $1.22 (in FY 2013) to $1.38 (in FY 2016) in disbursements for
every dollar of state taxation.
In contrast, the central region again with its concentration of state offices and universities
arguably suffered the most from the loss of state support for its university system and the
unpaid bills to health care providers and those who contract with the state. The loss of state
expenditures, which greatly exceeded the tax reduction in this region, caused the central Illinois
ratio to drop from 2.02 to 1.8 over two years. Similarly, the southern 19 counties, which
received a bit more than $3 in state spending for every state tax dollar in 2014, saw this ratio
drop to 2.88 as the stalemate led to greater losses in state expenditures than reduction in taxes
(see Appendix C).
These findings in some ways are not consistent with the rural resentment findings of the earlier
survey data and a great deal of political rhetoric and folklore that is widely accepted and heard
repeatedly in almost every political campaign in the regions. Some parts of downstate Illinois
clearly are receiving significantly more in state expenditures than they are paying in state
taxes. Of course, the term “fair share” used in our surveys could mean several things. One
possibility is fair means equal. Another is fair means our region should get more from the state
since we have greater needs. This question cannot be resolved with budgetary data. But we can
say there is no evidence for one of the most powerful myths in Illinois politics. With four years
of data over very different budgetary conditions, it is quite clear that downstate taxes are not
being disproportionately siphoned off and spent in the city of Chicago.
On the other hand, these findings are consistent with a more objective look at the state. The
Illinois tax system certainly is not progressive. Over the 2013-2016 period, the largest revenue
source was the almost 5% flat-rate income tax on most income, which was cut to 3.75% for half
of 2015 and all of 2016. The second largest source was the 6.25% state sales tax (with 1.25
percentage points returned to county and municipal governments) levied on most purchases
other than food, but not services. Counties with higher median household incomes obviously
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are going to generate more revenue dollars through these taxes, although we would not expect
much variation in percentage of total income going to these taxes.
On the spending side, the largest single item in the 2013-2016 General Funds was Medicaid,
which is paid for roughly evenly by the state and federal governments. Medicaid, which covers
both health care and nursing home care for the elderly, is need-based2. Hence, poorer counties
have proportionately higher enrollment numbers. The second largest budget item was K-12
general state aid to education, plus the mandated education categorical programs. As noted
above, historically, Illinois has not done nearly as much as other states to even out total
education spending across the state, but the formula in effect in 2013-2016, particularly with
the mandated categorical grants, did favor poorer and rural districts with greater busing and
special education needs over the wealthy ones on a per capita basis. Finally, the other major
portions of the budget – state payroll, state operations, four-year universities, and community
colleges – also favor downstate Illinois. Nine of the state’s 12 public universities, virtually all
state prisons and parks, and the state agency headquarters in Springfield are downstate.
Table 14 provides an estimate of how relatively important state taxing and spending is to the
different regions. The first column is regional GDP for 2015. We took the county GDP figures
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce and aggregated
them by the regions outlined above. The next four columns start with the CoGFA selected state
revenue numbers shown in Table 12, which are adjusted to estimate nontraceable revenue.
Then, federal Medicaid match funds were subtracted so only direct state (income, sales, lottery,
estate, insurance) taxation was included. Next, this state taxation was divided by regional GDP
to show the relative impact of General Funds taxation in each region. The final four columns
repeat this process for the disbursement side. The regional expenditure totals from 2013-16
were divided by 2015 regional GDP, and thus show the relative importance of state spending in
each region.

2

Approximately 20% of Illinois Medicaid expenditures in 2016 went to nursing home care and Medicare premiums
for low-income senior citizens.
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Table 14
State Revenue and Disbursements as Share of Regional Economies, 2013-2016
Revenue as % of GDP
2015 Regional
GDP

Disbursement as % of GDP

2013

2014

2015

2016

2013

2014

2015

2016

Cook

$348,451,260,000

3.6%

3.7%

3.7%

3.1%

3.8%

3.8%

3.9%

3.5%

Suburban

$195,374,599,000

4.7%

4.8%

4.9%

4.1%

2.7%

2.8%

2.8%

2.6%

Downstate

$200,697,467,000

3.5%

3.4%

3.3%

3.0%

8.5%

9.0%

8.2%

7.0%

North

$56,328,460,000

4.9%

4.7%

4.6%

4.3%

7.0%

7.2%

6.8%

6.2%

Central

$102,987,864,000

3.9%

3.9%

3.8%

3.6%

8.6%

9.2%

8.2%

6.7%

Southwest

$27,102,036,000

4.8%

4.8%

4.8%

4.5%

8.0%

8.2%

7.8%

6.7%

South

$14,279,107,000

4.3%

4.2%

4.1%

3.9%

15.2%

16.1%

14.1%

12.2%

Revenue equals selected state tax General Funds revenue minus federal Medicaid reimbursement by county.
Disbursements are from General Funds to counties. All county data from CoGFA 2013-2016. GDP data from Bureau
of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. County totals aggregated to regions by authors.

Table 14 shows only slight variations across regions in the relative size of the tax burden.
Chicago and the wealthier suburban counties generate far more tax revenue dollars in Table 12.
But as a percentage of regional GDP, the tax load effect is only slightly progressive, with the
wealthiest suburban region paying about one half percentage point more than the poorest
south region in 2013. And this difference dropped to two tenths of a percentage point when
the lower income tax rate was in effect in 2016. This, of course, is to be expected once the
need-based federal Medicaid revenues are subtracted, given the essentially flat-rate taxes used
in Illinois. The very slight progressive differences that do appear are likely the result of
exempting the first $2,150 per person and all retirement income (Social Security, pensions,
401k, etc.) from the 4.95% state income tax. This effectively lowers the rate in regions with
significant near-poverty-level populations or large concentrations of retirees. Food and
prescriptions are subject to a 1% sales tax rate, while other purchases (but not services) have a
6.25% sales tax.3 This, too, somewhat lowers the tax load on lower income groups, which tend
to spend more of total income on these essentials.

3

County and municipal governments are allowed to add additional sales tax to the base 6.25% state rate. Five
percentage points of the base sales tax goes to the state with 1.25 percentage points returned to local
government.
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State expenditures, on the other hand, vary a great deal more in their importance to various
regional economies. In the wealthiest suburban five counties, the selected state spending was a
very modest 2.7% of GDP in 2013. The spending cuts created by the budget stalemate reduced
this by a negligible amount to 2.6% in 2016. In urban Cook County, the state expenditures
account for a larger share of the total economy than in the suburbs, at 3.8%. The budget
stalemate reduced this to 3.5% of total economic activity by 2016.
By far the largest impact of state spending in relation to other economic activity is downstate.
State spending was equal to 9% of the economy the last “normal” year of 2014 for this 96county region, and it fell to 7% in 2016. And this average hides much larger variations across
the subregions. The 18-county north region is closest to Cook County, with state expenditures
at 7.2% of GDP in 2014, falling to 6.2% in 2016. The central region, with its concentration of
state offices and universities, had state spending account for 9.2% of GDP in 2014, which fell
sharply to 6.7% during the 2016 shutdown year. And in the southern 19 counties — clearly the
poorest part of the state — state expenditures, which were equivalent to 16.1% of GDP in 2014,
were cut sharply to 12.2% of GDP during the budget shutdown in 2016.
Table 15 below presents an estimate of the broad impact of these changes in state spending.
County-level GDP data has been available through the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau
of Economic Analysis only since 2015. We took this county-level data and aggregated it to
regions for the four years of most concern to this paper in Table 15.
The calendar years (CY) of the BEA data of course do not overlap cleanly with the fiscal year (FY)
data the state uses. CY 2015, as noted above, was the first year of the budget stalemate, with
the 25% income tax cut taking effect January 1, but with cuts in spending really not appearing
until after July 1. CY 2016 and the first half of CY 2017 were full stalemate periods.
Statewide, Table 15 shows very modest 1.2% growth for the two-year 2015-2017 period. But as
expected, regional effects are sharper. The suburban counties that were least affected by cuts
in the state budget show 2.2% total growth over this period. At the same time, downstate
Illinois experienced -0.67% change in GDP with even larger drops of -1.73% and -0.78% in the
central and southwest regions respectively. Since the standard definition of a recession is
negative GDP growth for two or more quarters, we can say that downstate Illinois in general
and central and southwest Illinois in particular endured a modest recession from 2015-2017,
which ended with positive growth in all regions in 2018.
Many factors, of course, influence economic growth. State spending is only one, and certainly
not the largest. However, given the size of state spending cuts outlined in Table 12, and the
importance of state spending to downstate economies described in Table 14, it is probably not
a coincidence that the budget stalemate coincides with economic downturns in the regions
most dependent upon the state, and that the downturn ended when state taxation and
spending returned to pre-stalemate levels in 2018.
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Table 15
GDP by Region, 2015-2018
2015

2016

2017

2018

Change 2015-2017

Cook

$348,451

$351,380

$354,455

$362,064

1.69%

Suburban

$195,375

$196,701

$199,778

$203,001

2.20%

Downstate

$200,697

$198,873

$199,359

$204,705

-0.67%

North

$56,328

$56,428

$56,896

$57,630

1.00%

Central

$102,988

$101,425

$101,234

$104,611

-1.73%

Southwest

$27,102

$26,749

$26,893

$27,758

-0.78%

South

$14,279

$14,272

$14,335

$14,706

0.39%

$744,523

$746,955

$753,591

$769,769

1.20%

Total

All figures in millions (i.e., x 000.000). GDP data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
County totals aggregated to regions by authors.

Residing in Jackson County, one of the southern 19, we can easily see the importance of state
expenditures in the local economy. The largest regional employer is Southern Illinois University
at Carbondale. A small state penal facility, which had been shuttered, reopened in
Murphysboro, and significant numbers of employees of state prison and mental health facilities
located in neighboring counties reside in Jackson County. Similarly, the region is home to many
retired government employees who receive and spend monthly checks from one of the public
retirement systems. Southern Illinois Healthcare (SIH) is the largest nongovernmental
employer, but significant portions of its revenue come from state employee health insurance
and Medicaid. The next largest employers include the cities of Carbondale and Marion, which
receive Local Government Distributive Funds, and several school districts, which receive the mix
of K-12 and mandated categorical funding. Without these state expenditures and the multiplier
effect created as they pass through private businesses, which supply state institutions and cater
to state employees, there would be a great deal less county economic activity in deep southern
Illinois.
These findings also may help explain the broader question posed earlier of why there is
significant rural resentment and some urban resentment in Illinois politics, but less suburban
resentment. In the context of the broader economy, the regions that are doing least well show
the highest resentment levels, while those that are better off show the lowest. But blaming
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state government for the perceived inequities is somewhat mistaken. True, the poorer regions
are carrying almost the same relative tax burden as the better offs under the tax system in
effect at the time of this writing. So, if one believes in progressive taxation based upon ability to
pay, there is much to dislike, or resent, in the Illinois tax system. On the other hand, the lower
income regions of Illinois as a whole are receiving significantly more in state expenditures than
they contribute in taxes. Indeed, in the most southern region, there would be very little
economic activity at all without the state.
Probably all agree that Illinois has a “structural budget” problem or that revenues in normal
times fall short of the spending built into the basic budget. But there is significant disagreement
on the solution. As noted above, a proposed constitutional amendment to allow a graduated
income tax, which would have applied higher rates to higher levels of income, failed in the 2020
election. This invalidates a proposed progressive tax code passed by the legislature in 2019 that
would have raised an estimated addition $3 billion of new income tax revenue. Hence, the
constitutional requirement for a flat-rate income tax remains, along with a structural deficit of
at least that amount, separate from the short-term deficits driven by the economic effects of
the pandemic, as we await the spring 2021 legislative session. None of the options available to
Governor Pritzker look very attractive from a political standpoint (Champaign News-Gazette,
December 20, 2020).
Budget deficits, of course, can be addressed on the revenue or the spending side, or some
combination of the two. Looking at the data above, it is hard to see much of a $3-plus billion
problem that can be solved on the spending side. The biggest budget item is Medicaid. But that
amount is locked in, short of major program eligibility changes, plus any cuts there are doubled,
as federal support is essentially matching dollar for dollar. The second biggest expenditure is K12 education. That, too, is governed by formula. It theoretically could be changed by the
General Assembly, but doing so almost certainly would lead to property tax increases in many
districts, along with the political uproar that was sufficient to protect this category even during
the 2015-2017 stalemate.
The third largest budget item is pension system contributions, which often provided budget
flexibility prior to 2010. However, this, too, seems untouchable at this time. The Illinois
Supreme Court in two major cases (Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 and Heaton v. Quinn, 2015) ruled
6-1 and 7-0 that existing health care payment and pension benefits for both present employees
and retirees are protected as contractual obligations by the state constitution. Slowing the
present repayment schedule designed to have all the systems fully funded by 2045 could
reduce annual payments from the General Funds, but would almost certainly bring a
downgrade in the state’s credit rating to “junk bond” status from the national ratings
agencies. Not paying bills, as was done in 2015-2017, certainly is not a long-term solution, as
well as being a very expensive way to borrow short-term money given the 9% and 12%
penalties levied on unpaid accounts.
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That leaves universities/community colleges and social service agencies as primary targets,
much as was the case during the stalemate years. There are many very persuasive arguments
that the continued defunding of post-high school education, which began about 2000, is a very
bad policy decision for the 21st century. Furthermore, it would not help much with a $3 billion
problem. A significant 10% cut in state funding for the combined budgets of the four-year
universities and community colleges would be about $150 million, or about 5% of $3 billion.
So, it appears that an increase in the flat income tax rate will be needed, possibly coupled with
some expansion of the sales tax base, which is currently very narrow, as another possibility, if
the structural budget problem is to be addressed. An income tax rate increase of one
percentage point to 6% would raise about the same $3 billion as the defeated graduated
income tax proposal. Or a smaller rate increase could be combined with an expansion of
categories subjected to the sales tax.
Conclusion
Returning to the broader question we began with – the assertion that perception is more
important than the facts – is a fundamental axiom of politics that does not bode especially well
for mass democracy. Facts should count for something – indeed, for a lot – and are essential to
any form of rational decision-making. Rational action at both the individual voter level and the
aggregate public opinion level is crucially important in a representative democracy. The
operation of a successful mass democracy depends in the long run on the people being well
informed and acting according to reality rather than inaccurate perceptions and myth.
The founders of the republic and the writers of the U. S. Constitution understood that
requirement well and enshrined it in the First Amendment as what the Supreme Court calls
“the preferred freedoms,” including freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, the freedom of assembly, and the right to petition the government.
That is why we share with the founders the conviction that it is important for political leaders to
get the facts and make decisions based on the best information available in order to make
policy based on the facts and the evidence. The same requirements are no less important for
the people as they make their decisions in the voting booths every two years in each of their
states and nationally for president and for the composition of the every two and four years.
These requirements for a fact-based discourse are crucial to the mass media as they are the key
channels of political information for the public.
The conflict over what are facts, and what is “fake news,” has become a flash point for
confusion, anger, and conflict in our polarized nation recently. It has been front and center in
the deeply divisive controversy over what the scientific facts about the COVID-19 pandemic are
and what mass public health care precautions they require versus the urge to reopen the
economy quickly and prematurely, even with life-and-death consequences.
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We hope this paper contributes in some part to establishing what the facts are about the
raising and distribution of scarce resources in Illinois, what the people’s perceptions are, and
what the gaps are between those two important ingredients of mass and representative
democracy in America today.
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Appendix A
Limitations of the Data
“Although {the} overall regional pattern is clear, state tax collections and disbursements cannot be
accurately calculated for individual counties----which are somewhat arbitrary geographic divisions rather
than functional economic or social units. The effects of a state institution----such as a university,
facilities providing institutional care, or prison----on state disbursements can be misleading, especially
for a downstate county with a small population. Such institutions typically provide regional or even
statewide benefits; allocating their spending to only the counties containing them ignores their benefits
to other counties. For those and other reasons, the numbers in this report may be more nearly correct
at a regional level rather than for individual counties.
Another reason for caution in using the numbers in this report is that they do not (and cannot) reflect
either all state revenues from, or all state disbursements to, any county or other area.**
A third reason for caution is that many revenues and disbursements cannot be precisely tracked in
coming from or going to individual counties. We used various methods to estimate the amounts going
from and to each county.”

Source: Cover letter from Thomas J. Bazan, Assistant Research Administrator and Sarah E. Barlow,
Senior Research Associate at the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability to The
Honorable William Davis dated September 3, 2019. Provided to the authors by Representative Davis.

**Revenue/Distribution Percentages Captured of the Total Statewide for the Study Years
FY 2013

FY 2014

FY 2015

FY 2016

Revenue

80.0%

79.1%

76.4%

69.0%

Disbursements

71.0%

75.8%

75.0%

65.0%

Source: Reports provided by CoGFA for each fiscal year. See the Bibliography.
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NOTE: The following Maps in Appendix B were compiled and made available in the reports from the
General Assembly’s Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability cited in the
Bibliography and acknowledged in the first part of this paper.
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Appendix B: Ratios of Disbursements to Revenues by County, FY 2014

Note: See accompanying report for explanation and limitations on the data in this Appendix.
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Appendix B: Ratios of Disbursements to Revenues by County, FY 2015

Note: For several reasons, state tax collections and disbursements cannot be accurately calculated for individual counties. Reasons include the
effects of a single institution; an inability to allocate some types of state revenues and spending; and a reliance on estimates for some revenues
and spending. Please see the accompanying research for explanation and limitations on the data in this appendix.
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Appendix B: Ratios of Disbursements to Revenues by County, FY 2016

Note: For several reasons, tax collections and disbursements cannot be accurately calculated for individual counties. Reasons include the
effects of a single institution; an inability to allocate some types of state revenues and spending; and a reliance on estimates for some revenues
and spending. Please see the accompanying research for explanation and limitations on the data in this appendix.
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Appendix C: Illinois Regions: Ratio of State Funds Received Compared to Revenue Generated
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